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Abstract
This paper looks into potential determinants of the mode of international com-
petition in a polluting good market by analyzing a strategic interaction between
two environmentally concerned governments. From the equilibrium outcomes of
our game based on an international duopoly model with transboundary pollution,
we show how a resulting form of international competition can be in°uenced by,
among other things, the magnitudes of the marginal damage cost and transbound-
ary impact of pollution and also the degree of similarity between the two nations
in these aspects.
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1 Introduction
The large literature on the gains-from-trade proposition initiated by Samuelson (1939)
generally asserts that free trade is gainful to all the participating nations. Moreover, the
so-called `new trade theory' which incorporates imperfect competition and/or increasing
returns has found a new source for gains from trade. Among others, Markusen (1981)
makes it clear that the opening of trade promotes competition, from which trading coun-
tries can gain. However, environmental considerations are usually missing in the existing
literature on gains from trade under imperfect competition although environmental con-
siderations seem to play an increasingly important part in recent negotiations over more
liberalized trade regimes at both global and regional scales. This is exempli¯ed in the
debates over NAFTA where freer commercial interactions in North America was opposed
by some partly on the ground of environmental protection. Similar arguments have been
frequently made by citizen groups who persistently resist so-called globalization, as was
symbolically manifested in their feverish oppositions towards the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) Round Talk in Seattle in 1999.
As is easily imaginable, possible existence of gains from international trade in a pol-
luting product is dependent on the market structure as well as the preferences of citizens.
On top of these, when the pollution issue is transboundary by nature, the welfare impact
of international trade could also depend on the physical characteristics of a pollution
issue. The welfare implications of environmental variables in transboundary pollution
problems have been typically investigated in game-theoretic studies without accounting
for international trade. Important examples of such studies are MÄaler (1990) and Tahvo-
nen, Kaitala, and Pohjola (1993) for °ow pollution, and Kaitala, Pohjola and Tahvonen
(1992) and MÄaler and de Zeeuw (1998) for stock pollution.
Conversely, though, there might be situations where the form of an international
competition in a polluting good market should not be given a priori and can be in°u-
enced by the characteristics of the environmental problem at hand. This paper aims
to explore such a possibility by explicitly modeling the strategic interaction surrounding
governmental decision makings which, consequently, determine possible modes of inter-
national trade in the presence of transboundary pollution associated with the production
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of a potentially tradable good. In particular, we demonstrate that both Stackelberg and
Cournot-Nash types of duopolistic competition, in addition to the autarkic situation, are
possible equilibrium outcomes, depending upon the magnitudes of marginal damage cost
and transboundary impact of pollution, as well as how similar the concerned nations are
in these aspects.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our basic model of an economy with
transboundary pollution and derives its autarkic outcome. By extending the model to
a two-country world, the next section characterizes potential free trade outcomes under
two di®erent modes of international competition. Then, Section 4 describes our inter-
governmental game whose result determines the structure of an international market of
a polluting product and discusses the implications of its equilibrium outcomes. The last
section contains brief concluding remarks.
2 Autarky
This section develops our basic model and describes its autarkic outcome. The model
is comprised of two countries (Home and Foreign), two goods (Goods 1 and 2), and one
primary factor (labor). We assume that both countries share the identical preferences
and production technologies, and produce both goods. In the following description of
our model, we focus on Home since the Foreign country can be described symmetrically.
We denote each Foreign variable by attaching an asterisk (*). Furthermore, Good 2
serves as a numeraire and is produced with a unitary input coe±cient so that the wage
rate is internationally equalized and ¯xed at unity. In the autarkic case, Good 1 is
monopolistically supplied by a single domestic ¯rm and c > 0 units of labor are required
to produce one unit of Good 1. Hence, the marginal cost of production is assumed to
be constant at c. In addition, the production of one unit of Good 1 entails one unit of
pollutant emissions.
Now, let us suppose that the utility function of a representative consumer in Home
can be speci¯ed by
V = AC1 ¡ C
2
1
2
+ C2 ¡ s
2
Z2; A > 0; s > 0; (1)
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where V is the consumer's utility level, Ci; i = 1; 2, is the consumption of each good,
and Z is the pollution level in this country. We assume that the pollution generation
associated with the consumption of Good 1 is treated as a negative externality by this
consumer and, therefore, out of its control. Letting p denotes the price of Good 1 mea-
sured by the price of Good 2, utility maximization subject to the budget constraint yields
the demand function of Good 1:
C1 = A¡ p:
Under autarky, the market-clearing condition is
A¡ p = x;
where x is the output of Good 1. Hence, the inverse demand function and the monopoly
¯rm's pro¯t are respectively de¯ned by
p = A¡ x; (2)
¼ ´ (A¡ c¡ x)x: (3)
Using (2) and (3), the social welfare of the nation, U , which is the sum of the consumer
surplus, the monopolist's pro¯t, and the environmental damage cost of the pollution, can
be expressed as
U =
(A¡ p)2
2
+ ¼ ¡ s
2
Z2: (4)
In the subsequent analysis, (4) determines a payo® of the government in each situation.
As for the transboundary e®ect of the pollution, we assume that one unit of Foreign's
(resp. Home's) pollutant emissions x¤ (resp. x) increases Home's (resp. Foreign's) ambient
pollutant level by the fraction of ® 2 [0; 1] (resp. ®¤) while one unit of domestic emissions
increases its own ambient pollutant level by one unit. The values of ® and ®¤ are what are
sometimes referred to as `transportation coe±cients', but we instead call them `pollutant
import coe±cients' here in order to emphasize the directions of the pollutant °ow. In the
case of global pollution, such as CO2 that is a culprit of the global warming problem, we
have ® = ®¤ = 1, while both ® and ®¤ are normally strictly smaller than one and take
di®erent values in so-called regional environmental issues, such as the transboundary acid
rain problem in Northern Europe. When ® = ®¤ = 0, on the other hand, the pollution
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problem is completely localized. In sum, the pollution levels in respective countries are
described as
Z = x+ ®x¤; (5)
Z¤ = x¤ + ®¤x: (6)
Let us now formulate the optimization problem of each country's ¯rm. Again, we
focus on the Home ¯rm since its Foreign counterpart behaves in exactly the same fashion.
Speci¯cally, the Home ¯rm solves the following problem in the autarkic case:
max
x
(A¡ c¡ x)x;
whose solution can be immediately obtained as
xA =
A¡ c
2
; (7)
where the superscript A represents the autarkic outcome. Also, the autarkic price is
derived from the demand function as
pA =
A+ c
2
: (8)
Substituting (7) and (8), as well as (3) and (5), into (4), the payo® of the Home
government in the autarkic outcome can be calculated as
UA =
3¡ s(1 + ®)2
8
(A¡ c)2: (9)
It should be noted that, even under autarky, the welfare of Home is a®ected by the
production level in Foreign through the transboundary pollution in (5). Hence, there
exists a negative externality associated with the production of Good 1 across the two
countries. The next section extends this model to an international duopoly in two di®erent
modes of competition.
3 International duopoly
When the two domestic markets of Good 1 described above is fully integrated interna-
tionally, the new market-clearing condition becomes
C1 + C
¤
1 = 2(A¡ p) = x+ x¤;
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which is inverted to yield
p = A¡ x+ x
¤
2
: (10)
This de¯nes the inverse demand function for Good 1 in the international market of Good
1 and each ¯rm's pro¯t function becomes
¼ =
µ
A¡ c¡ x+ x
¤
2
¶
x:
First, we consider the case where the two ¯rms are engaged in a Cournot-type competition
in this international market. In essence, these ¯rms determine their respective output
supply levels concurrently. Speci¯cally, these two ¯rms respectively attempt to solve the
following optimization problems:
max
x
¼ =
µ
A¡ c¡ x+ x
¤
2
¶
x;
max
x¤
¼¤ =
µ
A¡ c¡ x+ x
¤
2
¶
x¤:
One can immediately obtain the ¯rst-order conditions:
A¡ c¡ x
¤
2
¡ x = 0;
A¡ c¡ x
2
¡ x¤ = 0;
which lead to their respective reaction functions:
x = A¡ c¡ x
¤
2
; (11)
x¤ = A¡ c¡ x
2
: (12)
Solving these equations simultaneously, we can obtain the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
levels of output supply for the two ¯rms:
xC = x¤C =
2(A¡ c)
3
: (13)
Furthermore, the equilibrium price becomes
pC =
A+ 2c
3
: (14)
Comparing (8) and (14), we can easily con¯rm pC < pA, which implies that the procom-
petitive e®ect of the opening of international trade emerges in our model.
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Moreover, the payo® of the Home government can be obtained by substituting (13) and
(14), together with (3) and (5), into (4). Consequently, we have the Home government's
payo® as
UC =
4¡ 2s(1 + ®)2
9
(A¡ c)2:
As another possible mode of international duopoly under free trade, we also consider
the case where the two ¯rms are engaged in a Stackelberg type competition. In a Stack-
elberg duopoly game, the leading ¯rm is somehow able to make a credible commitment
with respect to the supply level of Good 1 prior to its follower.
Substituting (12) into the de¯nition of ¼ above, the Home ¯rm's pro¯t function, when
it acts as the Stackelberg leader, can be described as
¼ =
µ
A¡ c¡ x+ x
¤
2
¶
x
=
µ
A¡ c
2
¡ x
4
¶
x:
Thus, from the pro¯t maximization problem of this Stackelberg leader, we can easily
derive the following levels of output supply in this Stackelberg equilibrium:
xL = A¡ c; (15)
xF =
A¡ c
2
; (16)
where xL and xF respectively denote the output levels of the leader and the follower.
Furthermore, the equilibrium price, pS, becomes
pS = A¡ x
S + x¤S
2
=
A+ 3c
4
: (17)
Comparing (14) and (17), we can observe pS < pC , i.e., the price of Good 1 is lower
under the Stackelberg competition than under the Cournot-Nash competition. Hence,
the procompetitive e®ect of international trade is strengthened further in the Stackelberg
outcome.
Finally, substituting (15)-(17), together with (3) and (5), into (4), we have the payo®s
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of the countries with the leader ¯rm and the follower ¯rm, respectively, as
UL =
17¡ 4s(2 + ®)2
32
(A¡ c)2; (18)
UF =
13¡ 4s(1 + 2®)2
32
(A¡ c)2: (19)
4 The inter-governmental game
In this section, we introduce a game between Home and Foreign governments over their
respective ¯rms' roles in the international market of Good 1. This game takes place prior
to the international duopoly game described above, and the players are the governments
of the two nations, instead of the ¯rms themselves as is commonly supposed in so-called
endogenous-timing studies.1 Here, we suppose that the government can intervene the
market only as regards the timing of the participation of its own ¯rm in the international
market of Good 1 and it does not possess any other kinds of policy measures. Such
a setup could be supported by the argument that, although the implementation of an
environmental policy might be di±cult for informational and/or institutional reasons, a
national government would be able to control the openness of its market relatively easily.
For simplicity, the strategy space of this inter-governmental game is restricted to f1, 2,
no tradeg and we only consider pure strategies. The two governments' actions e®ectively
commit their own ¯rms to the speci¯c timings of entering into the international duopoly,
and jointly determine their respective roles in this market. When one government chooses
1 and the other chooses 2, the former nation's ¯rm assumes the role of the Stackelberg
leader in the international duopoly, while the ¯rm in the latter country becomes the
Stackelberg follower. When the two governments choose the same number, the mode of
international competition becomes that of the Cournot-Nash type, i.e., the concurrent
choices of output supply levels by the two ¯rms. Moreover, we suppose that a ¯rm cannot
export its product when its government decides to close the domestic market to import
from the other country. Hence, when at least one of the two governments chooses `no
1Syropoulos (1994) analyzed the endogenous timing game of governmental trade interventions with
di®erent kinds of policy instruments in a similar framework to Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). Our model
di®ers from his framework, especially, in that an outcome of our governmental interaction determines
the timings of moves in a game where the government themselves do not participate directly.
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trade', the autarkic situation arises in each country. The payo® matrix of this game is
described in Figure 1, with all the payo® values respectively corresponding to the ones
described in the preceding sections.
(Figure 1 around here)
As we discuss below, the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes of this whole
game can be categorized into several di®erent classes, depending upon the values of s,
the marginal cost of pollution, and ®, the transboundary pollutant import coe±cient, as
well as upon whether the two countries are symmetric or not. Observing Figure 1, in
combination with the payo®s of the governments under di®erent circumstances obtained
above, we can derive the Nash equilibrium outcomes of this inter-governmental game
and, therefore, the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcomes of the whole game, pos-
sibly including the international duopolistic competition between the two ¯rms afterward
unless the outcome of the inter-governmental game is `autarky'.
4.1 Symmetric case
We begin our analysis of the inter-governmental game above with a simple case where
the two countries share the same values of s and ®. That is, we suppose that s = s¤
and ® = ®¤ in this subsection. Since the two countries are completely symmetric in
these respects, we focus on Home for the description of this subsection. In this case, we
have only two possible equilibrium outcomes. The ¯nding is summarized in the following
statement.
Proposition 1. The Cournot-Nash competition in the international market can be a
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium outcome for the values of s and ® that satisfy the
following inequality. Otherwise, autarky is the only possible equilibrium outcome.
s <
5
7(1 + ®)2
: (20)
Proof. By construction, the autarkic situation always constitutes a subgame-perfect
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Nash equilibrium of the whole game. This is because, whatever action it may take, a
government's payo® is the same autarkic one when the other government chooses `no
trade' in the inter-governmental game. We now attempt to show that the Cournot-Nash
competition can also be an equilibrium outcome under certain conditions. In order for the
Cournot-Nash type competition to be a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in addition to
the autarkic situation, the government must, at least, prefer the Cournot-Nash outcome
to the autarkic one. Taking the ratio of UA and UC , we have
UA
UC
=
27¡ 9s(1 + ®)2
32¡ 16s(1 + ®)2 ; (21)
and setting UA=UC < 1 yields (20). Moreover, it is easy to show that the Stackelberg
outcome cannot be an equilibrium under any circumstance. In view of Figure 1, this
amounts to con¯rming that there is no circumstance under which one government wishes
its ¯rm to be the Stackelberg leader and the other wishes its ¯rms to be the Stackelberg
follower at the same time, in comparison with having their ¯rms compete in the Cournot-
Nash fashion. We start by deriving the condition under which the government prefers
to have its ¯rm become the Stackelberg leader to letting its ¯rm become one of the
Cournot-Nash competitors. Taking the ratio of UL=UC , we have
UL
UC
=
9[17¡ 4s(2 + ®)2]
32[4¡ 2s(1 + ®)2] ; (22)
and setting UL=UC > 1 leads to
s <
25
4(2¡ ®)(10 + 7®) : (23)
On the other hand, the government would be better o® by having its ¯rm become the
Stackelberg follower rather than a Cournot-Nash competitor if UF=UC > 1 holds. Taking
the ratio of UF=UC , we have
UF
UC
=
9[13¡ 4s(1 + 2®)2]
32[4¡ 2s(1 + ®)2] ; (24)
and setting UF=UC > 1 leads to2
s >
11
4(1¡ 2®)(10®+ 7) : (25)
2Condition (25) is meaningful only if ® < 1=2 because UF > UC trivially holds for any ® > 1=2.
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As is shown in Figure 2 in the ® ¡ s space, we can easily con¯rm that there is no
combination of s and ® that satisfy (23) and (25) simultaneously. Hence, the Stackelberg
outcome cannot be an equilibrium in the symmetric country case. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 implies that, given the pollutant import coe±cient (®), the government
would be strictly better o® by remaining in the autarkic situation when the marginal
cost of the pollution (s) is su±ciently high. Under such a circumstance, consequently,
the international trade of Good 1 does not materialize between the two countries. In other
words, if a country is su±ciently sensitive to the transboundary pollution, in terms of high
environmental damage cost and/or high vulnerability to external pollutant emissions, it
rationally opts for autarky for the fear of increased environmental damages from the
pollution, even though free trade in the good itself could be mutually gainful. The region
that satis¯es the condition for the realization of this outcome is depicted as region A
in the ® ¡ s space in Figure 2. On the other hand, the region where the Cournot-
Nash competition in the international market brings net gain from trade to each country
is indicated as region C. In the context of our endogenous timing model, there is no
possibility of a Stackelberg-type competition in the international market in the symmetric
case.
(Figure 2 around here)
Quite similarly to any other values of the pollutant import coe±cient, in the two
extreme cases of ® = 0, i.e., when the pollution problem is completely localized and ® = 1,
i.e., when the problem is global, both autarky and Cournot-Nash type competition are
possible equilibrium results. The exact outcome depends on the magnitude of marginal
damage cost of pollution, s. In the case of localized pollution, only autarky realizes if
s > 5
7
and Cournot-Nash type competition can realize if s < 5
7
. In the global pollution
case, 5
28
is the threshold value, instead of 5
7
. In fact, since the line, UA = UC , is monotone
decreasing in ® as can be observed in Figure 2, we conclude that the gain from trade is
more likely to materialize as the pollution issue is more localized in this symmetric case.
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4.2 Asymmetric case
When the two countries are asymmetric in terms of having di®erent values of the marginal
cost of the pollution (s) and the pollutant import coe±cient (®), a Stackelberg type
competition can also become a Nash equilibrium outcome of the inter-governmental game.
In order to simplify the descriptions, as a possible form of Stackelberg-type competition,
we focus on the case where Home's ¯rm is the Stackelberg leader and Foreign's ¯rm is
the follower. It should be noted that exactly the same argument holds even when the
roles in a Stackelberg equilibrium are reversed between the two ¯rms.
Before showing the possibility of a Stackelberg case as an equilibrium outcome, we
¯rst present the next statement concerning the Cournot-Nash outcome.
Proposition 2. When s, ®, s¤, and ®¤ satisfy the following two conditions,
s <
5
7(1 + ®)2
; (26)
s¤ <
5
7(1 + ®¤)2
; (27)
and, in addition, one of the following two conditions, the Cournot-Nash competition be-
comes an equilibrium outcome and both countries can potentially gain from trade:3
s >
25
4(2¡ ®)(10 + 7®) ; (28)
s¤ <
11
4(1¡ 2®¤)(10®¤ + 7) : (29)
Proof. When (26) and (27) are satis¯ed for the respective countries, both of them can
gain by moving from autarky to the Cournot-Nash type competition under free trade.
However, a Stackelberg outcome may be even more bene¯cial than the Cournot-Nash
outcome to both nations. Restricting our attention to a Stackelberg equilibrium where
Home's ¯rm is the leader and Foreign's ¯rm the follower, we can safely exclude such a
possibility if either UL=UC < 1 or U¤F=U¤C < 1 is satis¯ed. Each of these conditions can
be expressed as (28) and (29) in terms of the environment-related parameters. Q.E.D.
3Recall that (29) is meaningful only if ®¤ < 1=2 since any value of ®¤ > 1=2 leads to U¤C > U¤F
trivially.
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Again, as in the symmetric case above, the autarkic situation always constitutes a sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome of the whole game. However, this equilibrium is
weakly dominated by the other equilibrium outcome of the Cournot-Nash type competi-
tion when the conditions of Proposition 2 above are met.
In addition to the Cournot-Nash type competition, a Stackelberg type competition
which also weakly dominates the autarkic situation can arise in this asymmetric case.
Proposition 3. When s, ®, s¤, and ®¤ satisfy the following four conditions simultane-
ously, the Stackelberg-type competition with Home's ¯rm being the leader and Foreign's
¯rm being the follower emerges as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome.4
s <
5
4®(3 + 2®)
; (30)
s <
25
4(2¡ ®)(10 + 7®) ; (31)
s¤ <
1
4®¤(2 + 3®¤)
; (32)
s¤ >
11
4(1¡ 2®¤)(10®¤ + 7) : (33)
Proof. In order for this Stackelberg outcome to be a Nash equilibrium of the inter-
governmental game, ¯rst of all, the Stackelberg outcome has to be superior to the autarkic
outcome for both countries. Such conditions are given by UA=UL < 1 and U¤A=U¤F < 1,
which are respectively translated into (30) and (32). Moreover, these two countries must
simultaneously be better o® under the Stackelberg equilibrium in comparison with the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Hence, it must be the case that UL=UC > 1 or U¤F=U¤C > 1,
which are respectively transformed into (31) and (33). Q.E.D.
The region of having this type of Stackelberg competition as a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium outcome is depicted as region S and S¤ in the ® ¡ s space in Figure 3. It
4In order for (32) and (33) to be satis¯ed simultaneously, we need 11=2(1¡2®¤)(10®¤+7) < 1=4®¤(2+
3®¤) which is ensured under ®¤ < (¡26 + 12p15)=53.
13
should also be noted that a symmetric argument can be made for the case where Foreign's
¯rm is the Stackelberg leader and Home's ¯rm is its follower.
(Figure 3 around here)
When neither of the conditions of Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 is met, autarky is
the only equilibrium outcome. Similarly to the symmetric case above, when its marginal
cost of pollution is su±ciently high given the pollutant import coe±cient, the government
tends to be strictly better o® by remaining in the autarkic situation and, as a consequence,
the international trade of Good 1 may not materialize between the two countries. Even
when the Cournot-Nash outcome is dominated by the autarkic outcome for both countries,
under the conditions of Proposition 3 the Stackelberg outcome can also be an equilibrium
and free trade is bene¯cial to the two countries in this asymmetric case. Hence, we can
state, at least, in the context of our analytical model, that gain from trade is more
likely to be captured by each country with stronger dissimilarity in the environmental
characteristics across the country.
In view of Proposition 3, we can obtain further insights into the nature of a Stack-
elberg outcome. Firstly, it implies that, in order for a Stackelberg equilibrium to exist,
there needs to be a country with a very small import coe±cient for the transboundary
pollution. This country must also have a su±ciently high value of the marginal damage
cost of pollution. If these two conditions are concurrently met, this environmentally-
conscious country would be willing to have its ¯rm become the Stackelberg follower since
its consumers bene¯t from a lower price due to the expanded supply of Good 1 but does
not have to su®er too greatly from the transboundary pollution due to the associated
expansion of production in the other nation as long as the value of the pollutant import
coe±cient is su±ciently small.
Secondly, if there exists a Stackelberg equilibrium, it is always the case that the ¯rm in
a country with a lower marginal damage cost of pollution becomes the Stackelberg leader.
The country whose ¯rm is the Stackelberg leader is going to experience a signi¯cant
increase in its domestic production of the polluting good. A country with a lower value of
s is more resistant to the environmental damages associated with the expanded domestic
production and likely to assume the role of the Stackelberg leader.
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In one extreme case of ® = ®¤ = 0, i.e., when the pollution problem is completely
localized, all the three outcomes are possible, depending on the magnitude of marginal
damage cost of pollution, s. When s < 5
16
and s¤ > 11
28
simultaneously hold, the Stackel-
berg type competition with Home's ¯rm being its leader becomes an equilibrium outcome.
When s > 11
28
and s¤ < 5
16
simultaneously hold, on the other hand, the Stackelberg type
competition with Foreign's ¯rm being its leader becomes an equilibrium outcome. When
both 5
16
< s < 5
7
and 5
16
< s¤ < 5
7
hold, the Cournot-Nash type competition can materi-
alize. For any other combinations of s and s¤, autarky is the only equilibrium outcome.
It should be noted that, even when one country's marginal damage cost is very high, the
gain from trade can be reaped by each country in a localized pollution problem, provided
that the other country's marginal damage cost of pollution is su±ciently low, due to the
potential existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium in the asymmetric case in comparison
with the symmetric case.
In the other extreme case of ® = ®¤ = 1, on the other hand, the Stackelberg-type
competition never occur since no country would be content with allowing its ¯rm to
become the Stackelberg follower. If either s > 5
28
or s¤ > 5
28
holds, autarky is the only
equilibrium outcome and, otherwise, the Cournot-Nash type competition can also be
an equilibrium outcome. In the case of global pollution, therefore, the result here is
essentially the same as in the symmetric case.
5 Concluding remarks
Our analytical ¯ndings might provide some new insights into practical policymaking
issues surrounding trade liberalization when a transboundary pollution problem is one of
each government's interests. Trade liberalization in a good whose production generates
transboundary pollutant emissions has two opposing e®ects: procompetitive e®ect and
pollution-expansion e®ect. The welfare implications of these e®ects of international trade
could be contingent on certain environmental characteristics of each country, among other
things.
In our particular inter-governmental game, the governments can intervene the market
solely with respect to the timings of their ¯rms' entering into the international market
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and, consequently, determine the roles of their respective ¯rms there. The results of our
analysis indicate that the marginal damage cost of pollution and the transfer coe±cient
of transboundary pollution might play signi¯cant roles in determining not only the exis-
tence of net gain from trade but also the actual type of competition in the international
market of such an product. Our results also imply that the shape of the international
market and the existence of net gain from trade can possibly switch over time, as these
environmental parameters take di®erent values due, for instance, to the change in the
citizens' environmental taste and the development of new technologies to improve the
protective capacities of the societies against environmental threats.
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HomenForeign 1 2 no trade
1 UC ; UC UL; UF UA; UA
2 UF ; UL UC ; UC UA; UA
no trade UA; UA UA; UA UA; UA
Figure 1: Payo® matrix of the timing game
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Figure 2: Regions for Cournot-Nash and autarkic outcomes in the symmetric case
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Figure 3: Regions for a Stackelberg outcome in the asymmetric case
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